How Israel can return to the Middle East

The following article on Israel and the Arab Peace Initiative is by Benjamin Pogrund, winner of the Lifetime Achievement Awards at the 2013 International Media Awards. 

Israelis are so estranged from their region that the wider Middle East is another world to us. Now is the chance to test our neighbors' commitment to dialogue - through the Arab Peace Initiative - if we genuinely want peace.

At a dinner event in London I sat next to a Syrian. During the evening I had a long talk with someone from Bahrain who told me about his fight at home for human rights. I spoke to a man from Afghanistan who told me his hopes for his country's future. Also at the dinner were people from Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

To an Israeli it was an unusual and strange experience. All these people from our neighborhood, friendly and wanting to talk, to share information and thoughts. Yet we never see them, we know little about their aspirations and day-to-day lives. They are 'the enemy'.

We know that there are surreptitious contacts behind the scenes. Limited trade continues: in shops we can buy dates from Iran and dried lemons that come from Basra in Iraq. Israeli products make their way to countries in the region. Israeli tourists go to Petra in Jordan. There is undoubtedly contact at diplomatic and intelligence levels. Last month the Foreign Ministry announced it had established a diplomatic mission in a country in the Gulf state but it kept the location secret.

The Middle East is another world to us. It barely exists in our consciousness. We are focused on the United States and on Europe: we look there in politics, for travel and for culture.

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with that. Modern Zionism, which led to Israel's founding, was dominated by immigrants from Europe, joined later by those from the U.S. and other parts of the Western world. Their heritage underpins the nature of our society.

Yet nowadays, Sephardi Jews and Jews from Arab lands constitute nearly half of Israel's Jewish population, and 20 percent of our domestic population are Arabs. Geographically, we are in the Middle East.

We are on the edge of our eastern hinterland but we are remote from it. That is our loss and everyone's loss. We could be so enriched by contact with people, by two-way tourism and by trade.

It does not mean that we must turn away from the West. Instead we are a prime candidate for fusing the best of the East and the West and also for serving as a bridge between the two, to smooth misunderstandings and to further contact.

Of course it would be naïve and silly to put all the blame on ourselves for the lack of connection. Arab states have shunned us since 1948. Their formal boycott dating from that time continues up to now, and they incessantly harass and condemn us in international forums. Iranian leaders want to eliminate us. We have signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan which help to keep us out of war but we do not enjoy normal relations.

It goes without saying that a primary reason for what we don't have is the continuing conflict with Palestinians. That is such an overwhelming factor in our lives that we should be exhausting every possible opportunity to resolve it. That starts with getting out of the occupation, whose moral and material costs are as catastrophic for us as for Palestinians.

The cynical will say that we will never achieve closeness with our neighbors because they deny our very existence. That is true for some. But it does not apply to everyone and evidence of that is in the overtures made through the Arab Peace Initiative proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2002. Then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon looked the other way and pretended it had never happened. The Arab League took it over, backed by the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation. We have remained indifferent.

The API offers normalization of relations in exchange for withdrawal from territories we conquered in 1967; it speaks of a "just solution" for Palestinian refugees and the division of Jerusalem.

It certainly does not offer everything we want. It does not soothe all our fears. But the mere fact that it was put forward and 11 years later is still on the table is crucial – and even more because it was affirmed as recently as April this year with an amendment that limited exchanges of land would be acceptable.

The Arab Peace Initiative must not be viewed as a final take-it-or-leave declaration. It is an opening statement. It opens up the possibility of dialogue, negotiation and compromise. If we genuinely want peace we must seize the chance - and then put the Arab states to the test.

South African-born, Benjamin Pogrund was deputy editor of the Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, and later chief foreign sub-editor of the U.K.'s Independent newspaper. After moving to Israel in 1997 he founded Yakar's Center for Social Concern in Jerusalem. He is writing a book about Israel and apartheid.

Below is the link to the article on Haaretz:

http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/how-israel-can-return-to-the-middle-east.premium-1.529088

The Israeli Iron Dome

Israel’s Iron Dome, also known as the ‘Iron Cap’, is a mobile air defence system designed to protect populated areas across the country. After several years of development, the Iron Dome came online in early 2011 and has been criticised for its maintenance cost. The system was built by the Israeli company, Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, and was largely funded by the United States. In total, the US has set aside more than $200 million dollars to help Israel pay for the system, but financial concerns remain. There was haste to get system in to service to defend against Palestinian missile threats, particularly from the Quassam rocket type. The Israeli military have continuously praised the Iron Dome for its effectiveness during the current predicament with Gaza.

Questions have arisen about the operational effectiveness of the Iron Dome. According to Israeli officials, some 84% of targets engaged during the 2012 conflict in Gaza were hit.  Nevertheless, it has been suggested by Professor Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), that the success rate of the defence system may have been “drastically lower". Mordechai Scheffer, who previously worked for the RAFAEL Armament Development Authority, emphasised that the IDF’s claim of an 84% success rate was optimistic, placing the true success rate as low as 5-10%. In addition to this, Dr Reuven Pedatzur, noted military analyst and a professor at Tel Aviv University, argued that an atomic bomb can be an immediate danger to Israel’s survival, and as there is no guarantee that the system will work, the system in itself is useless. While the Iron Dome has probably prevented a large ground operation against Israel, questions remain about the implications of the system for the Middle East Peace Process.

The biggest issue with the Iron Dome is the clear division between Israel and the Arab states which surround it (including the occupied Palestinian Territories). It is believed by some to be instrumental in the peace process, and in the view of the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, “It gave us space and time”. The differentiation however fuels further separation and could be seen as a catalyst for an arms race, as it could encourage neighbouring countries to acquire larger quantities of missiles and rockets to penetrate the defensive cover.

The possibility of fuelling a further conflict maybe one thing Israel is willing to do in order to protect itself. The Iron Dome is the first part of a multi-layered defence strategy. The second, David’s Sling or the Magic Wand, is designed to target medium - to long-range rockets and cruise missiles. The joint US-Israel missile interception systems, such as Arrow 2 (operational) and Arrow 3 (in development) suggest there could be even more aggravation within the region. The Iron Dome could create the impression that Israel is prepared to tolerate enemy attacks to a degree. Moreover, these systems, including the Iron Dome, have the potential to tie Israel’s hands and could undermine trust in the country’s traditionally offensive approach.

All things considered, the lack of casualties among Israeli civilians could make any large-scale domestic or external military retaliation almost invalid. However, the Iron Dome does have weaknesses, one of them being unable to defend communities located in close proximity to the border of the Gaza strip. This problem poses a huge issue for the authenticity of the Iron Dome, as if it cannot protect the nation of Israel, what is the point of it being in existence? In a nutshell, Israel’s Iron Dome has the potential to promote differentiation and further fragmentation of the Middle East Peace Process.

Israel and Palestine Update

6^th of March - This year's Gaza marathon was cancelled by the UN agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA),  following the decision by the Gaza based group Hamas to ban women from competing alongside men, revoking their previous stance.  

7^th of March - Mohammed Asfour, a 22-year-old student studying sports, died after being shot in head by a rubber-coated steel bullet fired by Israeli troops during a protest in the West Bank. The incident took place during demonstrations across the territories following news of Arafat Jaradat, a Palestinian who died in Israeli custody, whilst being interrogated by the Shin Bet internal security service. The death of Jaradat heightened the tension in Israel as well as Palestine, as militants from Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades fired a rocket at Israel as a "preliminary response” to his death.

8th of March - Palestinian Bedouins could be forced to leave their land in the West Bank after private Israeli plans for a new town in the Ma'ale Adumim region were revealed. According to the Bedouins and their lawyers, it is the first stage in clearing the area of Palestinian controlled land. 

11th of March - Majdi al-Rimawi, a Palestinian convicted of killing Israeli government minister Rehavam Zeevi, has been granted honourary citizenship in the Paris suburb of Bezons. The decision has been criticised and Yigal Palmor, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said that was “no political view” that can justify the giving of this honour.

12^th of March – The World Bank has warned that the combined fiscal deterioration of the Palestinian Authority together with the Israeli closures and restrictions has caused “lasting damage” to the Palestinian economy. Economic activity declined considerably in 2012, in comparison to the healthy GDP growth in recent years. Key aspects have been the stagnation in the manufacturing sector; the productivity of the agricultural sector roughly halving; the decline in both manufacturing and agriculture sectors with the share of exports in the Palestinian economy dropping to 7% in 2011, from 10% in 1996; in addition to high levels in unemployment.

Notes from Gaza

The following notes are from Samuel Morris, who has been in Gaza on behalf of the NCF. Sam has been travelling in Israel and Palestine for much of the past month and these are his observations. As with all such comments from NCF sources, they and should be treated as a personal view, rather than an NCF perspective:


The last few weeks have seen protests spark across the West Bank and Gaza. The death of Arafat Jaradat while in Israeli custody, was the catalyst for this outpouring of anger. The treatment of prisoners has long been an issue, especially with the ongoing hunger strikes by a number of Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons without charge, most notably Samer Issawi whose hungerstrike has been running for well over 200 days. These protests united the Palestinian populous. In Gaza, marches and protests were held, factions united. For a few days the flags of Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad and the DFLP flew over the broken tomb of the unknown solider, destroyed by Hamas in 2006, in the Rimal district of Gaza city. In the West Bank the protests turned more violent. Unlike in Gaza, in the West Bank there are IDF soldiers at whom protesters can focus their anger, resulting in clashes over a number of days in towns throughout the West Bank. Retaliation from Gaza was limited to a rocket, fired from southern gaza hitting a road in Ashkelon. Responsibility for the rocket was claimed by Fatah's armed wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Many news publications reported this as the first breach of the November ceasefire, however, Israeli forces have shot and killed three people and injured at least 50 for straying to close to the perimeter fence since the beginning of the ceasefire.

In Gaza, there is little will for the escalation of this so called "Prisoners Intifada" in the Gaza Strip. Recent memories of the short but brutal war in November are still fresh in the mind. Hamas are more concerned with internal security issues than a third intifada. Security measures have tightened since "Operation Pillar of Defence" and the fear of losing secrets to the Israelis through "collaborators" is rife. Gaza courts have handed out 30 death sentences since 2007, many of them to people convicted of helping Israeli security forces. Hamas are stepping up their attempts to catch such collaborators. Their main concern, like Israel, is security, which has lead to a number of new security measures. International visitors must now apply for entry permission to be able to visit Gaza. These are usually limited to 33 days, but can be extended. More recently, Hamas has made it mandatory for any Palestinian leaving Gaza via Erez, into Israel, to have exit permission. Making the all but impossible task to gaining entry to Israel, even harder.

The eight day war, was seen as a victory by Hamas. Their perspective is that it showed that Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip is still strong. The conflict, brief but brutal, was seen as a success due to the strong response by Hamas. Even with their support waning in the Gaza strip, the perspective of many on the ground in Gaza is that Hamas showed strength during the operation. The brevity of the conflict, and the decision by Israel not to send in land forces, meant that it was far less damaging than Operation Cast Lead in 2007, but once again the response by Israel was seen as disproportionate.

On the surface Gaza has been becoming more prosperous. Hundreds of new buildings are being built throughout the Gaza Strip. However this is just a facade. Gaza is still oppressed, the problems are still there. Poverty and unemployment are rife. Shops may be better stocked with Israeli goods but life is still hugely difficult for the majority of those living in the Gaza strip. UNRWA recently published a report entitled "Gaza 2020". The report states that the population of Gaza will increase from its current 1.6 million to 2.1 million people in 2020. They estimate that this will result in a population density of more than 5,800 people per square kilometre. The report expresses concern that Gazan infrastructure, especially electricity, water and sanitation, are not keeping pace with the needs of this growing population. I can vouch for the fact that the water quality has decreased over the past few years and power cuts are constant; these issues are only set to get worse and the life for the average Gazan is set to get more difficult if Gaza's issues are not resolved. More food stuff and a greater number of cars being shipped in through the Kerem Shalom border crossing from Israel does not help resolve the key issues that that continue to affect Gaza. Without a drastic change to the blockade these key problems will remain and will only get worse as the population grows.

The tunnel trade has been the driving force behind all of the building. Construction materials are all but impossible to get from Israel and are hugely expensive when compared to the price of resourses coming from Egypt via the tunnels. The Gazan economy is still dependant on Israel. Imports have increased in volume from Israel recently, including the number of automobiles, however, the majority of all building materials still come through the tunnels. Prices can fluctuate, doubling overnight because of crackdowns on the Egyptian side of the border. It has been estimated that up to 60 percent of the estimated 1,000 smuggling routes under the border have been closed. Egypt has stated that it was cutting arms smuggling that was destabilizing the Sinai peninsula. However, Egyptian forces recently seized 20,000 liters of fuel ready to be smuggled into Gaza. Hamas is working with Egypt to improve the situation but things remain difficult. Hamas are optimistic in the long run; however, they understand that Egypt has its own problems and it will take time for any real improvements to be made. Morsi is struggling to keep control and Gaza is low on the list of their priorities.

Politically, Hamas are focused on the now stalled unity talks. There is a belief that uniting the Palestinian factions will put them in a stronger position politically. The Arab spring sent a signal, and after participating in a democratic process in January 2006 Hamas want to keep some form of legitimacy. This is why they want the coalition talks to succeed. A unity government ensures Hamas still has the legitimacy to rule that it feels it gained through the 2006 elections. However, legitimate or illegitimate, it is unlikely that anyone will be able to snatch the Gaza Strip from their control. The Hamas enclave, even though filled with dissenting voices, has given the organisation a taste of power and they are unlikely to relinquish their control. Their popularity in the West Bank is of more importance. If presidential election were held now, Hamas would most likely win.

The reconciliation process is difficult, no date for the resumption of talks has been set and the talks that were held were only cosmetic. However, there is optimism that there will be a way forward in the Hamas ranks. This optimism is not translated to the general populous, many of whom believe the bad blood created in 2007 will be too great to overcome. Hamas has blamed the breakdown of the Cairo talks on two problems. The first, confidence. There is still understandable distrust between Fatah and Hamas. Brutal actions in the past are hard to forget. The second is there is a disagreement over the process. Hamas think that Abu Mazen is not fully concentrating on the reconciliation process, that he has one eye on the peace process, America and Israel. However, to Hamas, the peace process is dead, pointless. They expect a right wing government in Israel and for things to remain the same. To them it doesn't matter what happens with the elections in Israel, they have seen many faces come and go and do not expect for there to be any movement politically. They view a unity government as far more important.

Support for Hamas is thin in Gaza. If elections were held it would be likely that Hamas would lose out to Fatah in the Gaza strip but win in the West Bank. There is a lack of hope in the younger sections of society. An apathy towards politics. Many young Palestinians have resigned themselves to a life of repression, conflict and pain. They see no solution to the situation and certainly no solution that would be fair. Without any process leading to the almost dead concept of a two-state solution, all that can be seen is the continuation of the status quo. For Palestine this means continuation of the resistance movement and not a political solution. With continuation of settlement expansion in the West Bank and the establishment of the E-1 plan, the concept of a two-state solution is even more difficult to conceive.

The case of Prisoner X

Until recently, the identity and existence of ‘Prisoner X’ in Israel was considered a myth. After much pressure, the government partially lifted the ban on reporting details of the imprisonment of Prisoner X, a ban imposed by an Israeli court after his arrest. Prisoner X was widely reported to be 34-year-old Ben Zygier. Zygier, who held both Australian and Israeli citizenship, was depicted as an agent of Israel’s Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, otherwise known as the Mossad; he was arrested in Israel in 2010 on unspecified acute charges. It has been said that the secrecy surrounding Zygier was so great that his prison guards were informed of neither his offence, nor his name.

In the 1990s, Zygier moved to Israel and was then recruited by the Mossad. The Mossad were eager to enlist individuals who held dual nationality, as it meant the individual could travel freely without needing to connect themselves to Israel. Zygier died in 2010, apparently hanging himself in the solitary confinement cell he occupied, which had originally been designed for Yigal Amir, assassin of the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The Israeli government refuses to comment on Zygier, and only confirmed his identity well after his death. If the claims made by the Australian broadcaster ABC are correct, the Zygier case represents a serious breach for the Mossad as an agency. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, has since acknowledged the issue but stresses that Israel’s security needs demanded that some information be kept secret.

The secrecy surrounding this case has led to speculations that Zygier was denied a fair trial or representation suggesting that Israel has breached international law. Under Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly, states that it is a fundamental right for an individual to have a fair trial. Nevertheless, Israel has ratified the declaration, by being a UN member state upon its creation in 1948. According to Avigdor Lieberman – Foreign Minister at the time - the prisoner’s rights were respected. 

The reports of Zygier’s treatment and his suicide in Ayalon Prison have caused problems for Australia. The country’s government has since been forced to admit that they were briefed over the case since his detention in February 2010. Previously, they had claimed to know nothing of Zygier's detention and death until his family asked for help to repatriate his body. Australia's Foreign Minister, Bob Carr, stated that Australia had been assured of Zygier's safety. It is also believed that Zygier was not the only agent who took advantage of the Australian law allowing individuals to change their name every 12 months and apply for a new passport each time. Zygier changed his name three times in total.

Michael Ross, a former Mossad agent, calls Zygier’s repatriation, induced identity changes and solitary confinement under its particular circumstances  ‘scandalous’. It does seem as though like Israel has crossed three key boundaries. Zygier, who worked for Mossad, was asked not to give up his Australian citizenship, creating a conflict of interest; he was sent to operate in Australia under his true identity. This jeopardised Israel’s relations with Australia, as well as all other nations for which it used foreign passports for, because any espionage committed will be recorded on the foreign passport.  Future Israeli action will inevitably draw greater external scrutiny.

The Death of the Two-State Solution?

The following notes are from Samuel Morris, currently in Gaza on behalf of the NCF. Sam has been travelling in Israel and Palestine for much of the past month and these are his observations. As with all such comments from NCF sources, they and should be treated as a personal view, rather than an NCF perspective:

2013 has been touted by many as the year to solve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The combination of a new American administration and the apparent surprise win by the centrist parties in the Israeli elections, meant that some thought the stars had aligned and a solution, or the beginning of one, might be on the cards. However three months into the year things do not look quite as positive.

The way that the elections were represented as a centre left success was flawed. Yes, Yesh Atid and Yair Lapid were big winners but whatever the outcome of the coalition talks, the new government will still be right of centre. The only difference will be the political make-up of the coalition, not policy. The shape of the the coalition ultimately doesn't matter. The issues that will be argued over are the draft for military service, the relationship between the secular and the orthodox and impending budget cuts - not the Palestinians.

The shift to the centre, politically, has only really involved a handful seats. The right-bloc may have got smaller but it has got harder, especially in relation to the settlements issue. An interesting footnote however is that this election may have signalled the end of the Russian voting bloc in Israel. Netanyahu made a mistake by joining with Yisrael Beitinu and creating a heavily right-wing list. However, Netanyahu was still the winner and is still in the driving seat. It was Likud as a party that took the hit.

This new voting shift reveals a new trend. The demise of the old elites within Israel. The big names from the secular Ashkenazi political establishment have been overtaken by the rise of a new elite. Bennett and Lapid are both examples of this trend. Young and modern, they represent these new elites of the Israeli right and centre.

Though the Israeli electorate is concerned with Israel's international image and with its isolation from the international community, Palestine itself was not the issue in this election. The Israeli electorate had other things on their mind. Ultimately, the unprecedented social movements that Israel has witnessed over the last couple of years, were translated into votes at the ballot boxes.
Bringing Livni into the coalition is seen as a message from the prime minister to US President Barack Obama that Israel is serious about the peace process. Especially with Obama soon to make his first appearance in Israel. Livni is likely to play a role similar to that of outgoing Defence Minister Ehud Barak in smoothing relations between Netanyahu and Obama. Livni's presence in the coalition is a coup for Netanyahu; now he can go on to form a right wing coalition while appeasing the Americans with the hollow olive branch of Livni to deal with the Palestinians. If Netanyahu can overcome the bad blood between himself and Bennet, then he will be able to form a coalition. Bennet and Lapid have reservations about joining a coalition with the Haredi parties. Both want to pass laws changing the status of the ultra-orthodox in Israel, something that would be impossible in a coalition with the Haredim. The strength of the Lapid-Bennet alliance may force Netanyahu to exclude Shas and the Haredim. The negotiations have become a staring contest. Who will blink first? Whatever the outcome, this makes bad reading for anyone who hoped 2013 would be the year for a break though in finding an achievable Middle East peace process.

There may be a genuine desire to reinstate 'the peace process', but in reality this means nothing. The resumption of the peace process means the resumption of the status quo not a step forward on the road to peace. Bilateral peace process negotiations are dead in the water whether Livni believes in them or not, and may be more harmful than no negotiations at all. Both Iran and the key regional issues in regard to Syria and Egypt rank higher on Israel's to-do-list than Palestine. However, if a reasonable deal was placed on the table, the majority of the Israeli public would accept it. The issue is that there is no one on the Israeli side to initiate such a deal and no Palestinian to accept it. Time is not on the side of the Palestinians. The policy of Israel toward Palestine is one of keep as much as you can for as long as you can. Ultimately, the concept of a two state solution is slowly slipping away. The only way that this can be changed is by the involvement of the international community.
There is now more security in Israel, with fewer attacks and a high level security apparatus now in play. For the first time since 1973 there have been no Israeli deaths in the West Bank or Jerusalem. The limitation of Palestinian control to a handful of Palestinian Authority "islands" in the West Bank is seen as a better situation than handing over full authority. There is a view that withdrawal from territory creates conflict. The examples of Gaza and South Lebanon are often cited as reasons not to withdraw from further areas. The political will to provide the Palestinians with a state is currently very weak. Security is the word that has dominated Israeli politics in recent years, not peace. However this ignores the fact that peace not only brings security, but stability.
The only way for Israeli politicians to feel the need to step into meaningful negotiations is if they have something significant to gain. The Abdullah Plan was a missed opportunity. It showed that the Arab states were willing to engage meaningfully with Israel, and would have provided the infective Arab League with a purpose. If it had been built upon, instead of being flatly rejected, the current situation could have been more positive. With the Palestinians third on priority list for the Israeli political elite, after Iran and Syria, a comprehensive peace plan is the only way forward. It may be the only framework within which to resurrect the dying concept of a two state solution, as it would provide Israel with considerable trade and security benefits at a time when Israel has major concerns over the changing face of the Middle East.

It is still uncertain how the escalation of Palestinian protests over the past few days will affect any ongoing negotiations to establish a governing coalition in Israel. There are worrying signs that the West Bank and Gaza are on the verge of a third intifada, and these signs have been there for a while. With the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations, the lack of any political solution and Israel's policy of settlement expansion in the West Bank, a third intifada seems sadly inevitable, if things continue as they are. All this tinder box needs is a spark. Whether the recent death of Arafat Jaradat will provide that spark, has yet to be seen.

And the winner is...

And the winner is...

With the dust settling in Israel, it is time to take stock over what has happened politically in the last twenty-four hours. With results almost in (98% counted as this is written) the Right-Orthodox bloc seems to have captured 61 seats out of the Knesset’s 120. (Numbers are still subject to change as IDF soldiers’ votes will come in slowly and could take until Thursday to be counted). This puts it in a near deadlock with Center-Left bloc on 59.

External opinions in the run up to the latest Israeli elections were all in agreement that yet another right wing coalition would be formed, dominated by the newly united Likud Beitenu party. However as the day ran on, the Internet hive went into its frenzy and things no longer looked so certain. Netanyahu sent pleas to followers to get out and vote, in what seemed at the time as only a ploy to garner more votes and stir the fringe Likud voters to the polls. However, with a reported 66% of eligible voters turning out, the highest since 1999, Israeli voters did not need stirring. As the first exit polls began to come in it was obvious that Netanyahu was taking a big hit and the centre was soaring.

This turn of events is a reminder of Lisa Goldman’s statement:

“Israeli politics is byzantine as Lebanese politics ‘If you understand it, it hasn’t been explained well.’”

The surprise winner from these elections came from the centrist Yesh Atid party. Recently founded by Yair Lapid, TV presenter and son of former Shinui Party leader Tommy Lapid, the party managed to secure 19 seats in the Knesset. This makes it the second largest party, eating a large proportion of Likud and Yisrael Beitenu’s 42 seats from 2009, which have been slashed to 31.

Yair Lapid is risk-averse. His policies took no tough stance, he is a populist. Lapid’s only significant polices are those addressing the relationship between secular and orthodox in Israeli society. The success of Yesh Atid is a protest vote against Likud, more than a vote for any particular policy. As king maker it seems likely that Yair Lapid will join a coalition with Netanyahu and is unlikely to be a bee in his bonnet. Likud suffered from its handling of internal issues and by producing a hard-right list. Those seen as moderate, such as Dan Meridor, Benny Begin and Mikey Eitan were cut in favour of more hard-line Likud voices.

Labour will be disappointed at this election. At 15 seats, only 2 more than Ehud Baraks all time low, they should have been the winners from this centrist rally and the Israeli social protests. But ultimately Yair Lapid stole the show, and the votes. Shelly Yacimovich, Labour’s leader can however look to lead a stronger opposition against what will most probably be a weak coalition. This is if they stick to their promise of never entering into a government with Netanyahu at the helm, possibly a reason why Amir Peretz jumped ship. As third on the list of Tzipi Livni’s Hatuna party, Peretz will be an MK after the party registered 6 seats. Meretz managed to double their seats also acquiring 6. Kadima looked to have imploded in the exit polls, not reaching the 2% threshold. However, final tallies have reportedly given 2 seats to the party, which secures Shaul Mofaz a seat in the Knesset.

The divided political opinions in Israel were once again revealed in this election. The difference in perspective and demography between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem highlights this. Yesh Atid dominating in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem’s majority voting for the Jewish Home Party, lead by Naftali Bennet, who won 11 seats.

For those thinking that a strong centrist vote may help the beleaguered peace process stutter back into life or make an impact on Israeli foreign policy, think again. These elections were about internal Israeli affairs. The Israeli people spoke at the polls and their view is that internal social and economic issues are more of a concern than the risk of Iran.  Not Iran, not Syria, and for the Palestinians it will be once again a case of, kick the can down road. Ultimately, even though the results were surprising, this election hails the status quo. Netanyahu will lead a coalition as forecast, just a different one than was first predicted. Yair Lapid, unless he comes to surprise us all, will not rock the boat when it comes to foreign policy. The main plus for the international community is that the position of foreign minister and deputy foreign minister cannot be filled by Avigdor Lieberman and Danny Ayalon respectively, a scenario guaranteed before this centrist shift.

As ever with Israeli politics, the horse-trading over the next few weeks looks to be as fascinating as the result itself.

Sam Morris

Ceasfire holding

The ceasefire continues to hold between the Hamas government in Gaza and the Government of Israel.

On a minor issue: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Israel has informed the NCF that there were no direct negotiations between Israel and Hamas in this regard despite a statement to the contrary by a usually well informed Israeli journalist.

1. There is a report that Israel was persuaded to accept the ceasefire because of a US promise to station troops in Sinai (and thus intercept Hamas arms supplies by Bedouin smugglers). However the source is regarded by some as unreliable.
2. There are those that suggest this is a golden opportunity to bring rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas (see below) . . .

Ambassador Marc Ginsberg, a former US Ambassador to Morocco, writes in his weekly column in "The Huffington Post" that now is the time for the US to pressure Hamas to bury its hatchet with Fateh and to finally acknowledge Israel's right to exist, if a Middle East Peace Process is to be restarted.

He suggests that President Obsama should use Bill Clinton as his special envoy -- both to ensure that the current Gaza/Israel ceasefire doesn't collapse and to forestall Iran from taking further advantage of the situation.
Ambassador Ginsburg overstates the role and influence of Iran in all of this. He probably also overestimates the potential role the US can play in resolving the broader crisis.

Unfortunately, to most Arabs -- and certainly to those governments and publics of the new Arab Spring -- the US has lost its ability to play "honest broker" in any issue involving Israel and the Arabs.
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"A Field Guide to the Gaza Truce: Merely 'Lock and Reload?'"

THE HUFFINGTON POST
By Ambassador Marc Ginsberg

21 November 2012
When Secretary of State Clinton, accompanied by Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Amr, jointly announced a few minutes ago at a Cairo press conference the elusive agreement to end the current round of hostilities between Israel and Hamas, the accord represented the first example of cooperation between the U.S. and the new Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt on a major Middle East regional security crisis.

Mrs. Clinton has nothing but praise for President Morsi and Egypt's role in helping to broker the understanding.

Whatever one calls the truce, ceasefire or "quiet for quiet" agreement that (temporarily) ends the latest round of conflict between Israel and Hamas, the accord comes not a moment too soon since it forestalls an inevitable Israeli incursion into Gaza, which Israel deemed essential to put an end to the missile attacks terrorizing its civilians.

As reported by "The New York Times," Israel agreed to stop all land, sea and air hostilities in Gaza, including the "targeting of individuals" -- a reference to militants of Hamas and its affiliates who have been killed. The cease-fire also calls on the Palestinian factions in Gaza to stop all hostilities against Israel, including rocket attacks and attacks along the border.

Two hours in and all's apparently quiet on Israel's western front except the sound of celebratory Hamas gunfire, as if Palestinians have not heard enough in recent weeks. Not unexpectedly, the agreement does nothing to address the far larger and consequential challenge that Hamas poses as an Iranian terrorist proxy, or for the aspirations of Gaza's Palestinian inhabitants for a long-term solution to their difficult and painful existence under Hamas rule.

Secretary Clinton's welcome and evidently successful mini-shuttle diplomacy between Jerusalem and Cairo, along with President Obama's round-the-clock consultations with Israeli PM Netanyahu and Egyptian President Morsi achieved the breakthrough, even though Obama and Clinton had made it clear during their swing through Asia that the U.S. had Israel's back and strongly supported Israel's right to defend itself in the face of the torrent of Hamas weapons fired against its civilians.

If Morsi and his Egyptian allies resented the strong American declarations of Israeli support, the Egyptian leader apparently did not let that get in the way of brokering an agreement with Washington.

As a consequence of the rapid-fire Egyptian-American led negotiations, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship may have taken important steps forward, perhaps ushering in a new bilateral phase focused on incubating the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, developing strategies for raising the credibility of the new Syrian government-in-exile, and enhancing Libyan domestic stability -- all challenges where both the U.S. and Egypt share common goals.

But consolidating the Gaza accord is clearly essential before achieving further regional cooperation and will be a rigorous test of this uneasy post-Arab Spring alliance.

Egypt emerges from the Gaza agreement as the principal "anchor tenant" -- assuming responsibility for policing Hamas's conduct in spite of the sympathy average Egyptians have expressed toward Hamas in recent weeks. After all, it was the Muslim Brotherhood that gave birth to Hamas in the first place, and it could not have been easy for Morsi to put the screws on his Hamas allies to stand down from their offensive.

Why Hamas decided it was in its interest to abide by Cairo's directives remains unanswered, but Hamas may have extracted from Morsi certain confidential side agreements... stay tuned.

So how do Israel and Hamas emerge from their latest confrontation and how will the agreements fine print and inferences be implemented?

As for Hamas, while it may have gained new stature and sympathy I heard nothing so far to indicate that it was able to extort from Israel a commitment to lift its economic blockade of Gaza -- Hamas' stated goal. Whether Israel will quietly relax parts of the economic blockade in the days ahead outside the prying eyes of the Israeli media will greatly depend on the sustainability of the ceasefire and whether Israel is convinced that Egypt is prepared to better police the Sinai weapons smuggling tunnels that is Hamas lifeline to Iran.

And what has Israel achieved for all of the terror inflicted on it by Hamas not only in recent weeks, but since Hamas expelled the Palestinian Authority from Gaza?

Regrettably, not much. The agreement represents merely a return to the status quo ante -- Hamas is still in power, and still going to do everything to resupply its missile stockpiles through the Sinai Peninsula smuggling tunnels. Reflecting the evident dilemma, Israeli PM Netanyahu's office issued a terse statement conveying Israel's willingness to accord Egypt's efforts a chance to achieve an end to Hamas attacks, while reserving Israel's right to act if the ceasefire fails to hold.

Israel's muted reaction reflects the somber reality that Hamas' capacity to fire missiles into Israel has not been substantially degraded despite the Israeli bombardment. In fact, up until the ceasefire, Hamas was still firing missiles and executed today's Tel Aviv bus bombing. Moreover, Hamas has gained new allies, which beat a door to Gaza city during the conflict to publicly stand shoulder-to-shoulder with their new Hamas allies.

Delegations from Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Qatar and Arab League all came to remonstrate solidarity -- a far cry from the days when Hamas was viewed in most of the Arab world as a terrorist organization carrying out Iran's beck and call (which, by the way, it still is).

In the warped mind of Hamas' leaders, the conflict's toll of dead and wounded civilians and infrastructure destruction is an inexpensive price for becoming the new kid on the Islamist block, further isolating Israel in the region.

Yet, the ceasefire is a step in the right direction even though the text has not yet been released. The agreement forestalls a far bloodier battle between Hamas and Israel. After all, had the talks failed their failure would have triggered an almost-certain Israeli ground offensive into Gaza with all of the attendant consequences that would likely eclipse the 2008 Cast Lead offensive since this time around, Israel would not vacate Gaza without having completely rounded up every last Hamas leader and destroyed every last weapon and smuggling tunnel, which they failed to do in 2008.

Soon after Mrs. Clinton's pronouncement, the White House issued a statement alluding to an American commitment to explore ways to more effectively police the perimeters of the Sinai Peninsula to prevent the weapons smuggling by Hamas and its allies from Iran that permitted such a "game-changing" missile offensive against Israel.

The Israeli embargo on the Gaza Strip had obviously failed to prevent the very military empowerment of Hamas that the blockade was principally intended to prevent. So if the Israeli blockade did not accomplish its principal objective, what will be done by Israel and the U.S. about the Sinai sieve?

That is one of the tactical challenges embedded in this announcement and it will be very interesting what role, if any, the U.S. committed to play to better police the lawless, Egyptian-controlled Sinai.

Also, by signing onto its provisions Washington announced its commitment to promote the long-term durability of the agreement. Secretary Clinton stated at her Cairo news conference the necessity of effective, ongoing diplomacy to prevent the agreement from unraveling.

Now on her way home and just about out the door -- Secretary Clinton is scheduled to leave her post when her successor is nominated. Symbolically, she has enormous stature and respect in the region. Diving into the deep cesspool of this latest Hamas Middle East crisis is the last thing she had in mind during her Asian victory lap; her willingness to hold onto this hot potato until she can safely and securely hand it off to her successor may be vital to the agreement's durability, even though I don't wish the task on her at all given the challenges it creates.

Under the Rahm Emanuel adage to never fail to take advantage of a good crisis, President Obama has an unexpected window of opportunity to re-engage a sustained, high-level U.S. diplomacy to push direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations out of its cryogenic state. Nothing could energize this moment more than having the president enlist the best American Middle East deal-maker in the world -- former President Bill Clinton.

That is one lousy reward for President Clinton's 24/7 tireless campaigning for Obama's re-election, but no one other than Mrs. Clinton has the admiration and respect of all of the parties to force them out their dangerous diplomatic death spiral.

As I stated in my last column, the Obama administration has no Middle East front bench to speak of. Its previous star players (George Mitchell and Dennis Ross) abandoned the playing field for their own respective reasons when neither could put any points on the board. They gave it their best try, but kept going back to their old, shopworn playbooks and the Gaza crisis provies how critical a time it is for the U.S. to come up with new ideas, new strategies and new blood to get the U.S. back in the game to rescue the absolute necessity for a two-state solution -- a strategic interest to us as well as to our allies.

As for Iran -- Hamas' principal arms supplier and state terrorist benefactor that pressed Hamas to launch this latest offensive in the first place -- what did it get out of this confrontation so far? Quite a bit, I am afraid.

Although its Hamas missile transfer racket may face new obstacles, just imagine the Ayatollahs' satisfaction as Arab adversaries of Iran rushed to Hamas' defense. Moreover, it was Iran's missiles that were tested against Israel's Iron Dome anti-missile system.

Although Iron Dome was a godsend preventing Israeli civilian casualties, Iran's missile-meisters now have battlefield information how Iron Dome operates for what likely will be a more lethal next round.

So the plot stays more or less the same -- destined, I am afraid to play itself out again but with more lethality given Iran's machinations and Hamas' embolden leaders.

During the crisis there were a slew of Middle East pundits who urged Israel to begin talking with Hamas as if Hamas deserved to be rewarded with an Israeli negotiator for blackmailing it with missile attacks. The pundits talked of the need for Israel to face new realities and act more responsibly toward Hamas.

Now don't get me wrong. I am all in favor of talking if there is a basis for negotiation otherwise fools' errands only delay hard choices.

Several years ago, I entered Gaza blindfolded and in a trunk of a car in order to meet with a fairly senior Hamas official. I wanted to hear Hamas' positions from the horse's mouth, so to speak. For hours, I listened to Hamas' representatives harangue against Jews -- spewing the a particularly virulent anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism normally echoing from other salafist and Islamic extremists I have encountered during my many years traversing the region.

Just read Hamas' Arabic charter for amplification. Can Hamas reengineer itself and moderate its resolute rejection of Israel's right to exist in any form? Only Allah knows.

But nothing so far indicates that all of Hamas' Koran-stoked terrorism will be ejected from its warped sense of reality.

Before anyone gets too rambunctious about pressuring Israel to deal with Hamas, how about pressuring Hamas to first negotiate a viable accommodation with its Palestinian Authority and Fatah brethren first. A united Palestinian leadership is essential to any viable Israeli-Palestinian negotiation.

Yet, on the margins of this crisis, and after years of inter-Arab mediation by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, Hamas and the PA remain at loggerheads -- refusing to compromise on basic principles.

That says a great deal about whether Hamas can ever be expected to plausibly retreat from its refusal to accept Israel's right to exist. Palestinians will need to make that choice, and American full-fledged diplomacy is crucial to compel Palestinians to make that choice. ###